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Deployment Strategies for Service Innovation
Qiang Wang , Chris Voss, and Xiande Zhao
Abstract—In large organizations, local use of innovations is not
enough; extracting the full use of the innovation requires deploy-
ment across the organization. The purpose of this paper is to
explore strategies for the deployment of service innovations and
factors influencing success. We adopt an inductive theory-building
approach with a longitudinal embedded case study of ten successful
service innovations. We find two deployment strategies: required
adoption, in which subsidiaries are required to adopt innovations,
and voluntary adoption, in which adoption is not compulsory—
innovations are showcased, but the adoption decision is left to the
subsidiaries. We have investigated the factors influencing deploy-
ment, including the decentralized nature of service innovation, fit
with the internal and external context, extrinsic and intrinsic mo-
tivations, and handovers. Based on analyses of case evidence, we
put forward research propositions accordingly. This study provides
managerial guidance for multidivisional organizations to extract
full value from service innovations. Although some results may be
particular to the Chinese context, research in other contexts can
broaden the generalizability of the findings.
Index Terms—Deployment strategies, innovation diffusion, lon-
gitudinal case study, multidivisional organizations, service innova-
tion.
I. INTRODUCTION
S ERVICE innovation stimulation has been identified as a ma-jor strategic priority for research and practice [1]. However,
the development and successful use of a service innovation do
not necessarily guarantee its broader deployment and success.
As such, Ostrom et al. [2] suggested that identifying drivers of
sustained service innovation is an important direction for future
research. For example, a new technology may be introduced
amid great enthusiasm and enjoy widespread initial acquisition,
but may nevertheless fail to be thoroughly deployed. This is of
particular concern in a multidivisional firm in which innova-
tions and technologies need to be deployed across diverse parts
of the organization. Current innovation research in services and
products focuses primarily on the process and strategies for
developing innovations: “Many new product introductions con-
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tinue to be unsuccessful, and while researchers have studied
product development processes, relatively few studies directly
address new product launch” [3, p. 901]. We study intracom-
pany deployment, i.e., the process of taking innovations and
successfully transferring them across all appropriate divisions
of the organization, leading to successful internal use or delivery
of services to customers.
The first objective of this study is to develop our under-
standing of the deployment of service innovations, which “has
not received sufficient attention in the empirical literature”
[4, p. 1067]. Costa et al. [5] and Wang et al. [6] re-emphasized
the need to investigate deployment issues (especially in a ser-
vice context) to maximize profits. Building on the seminal work
by Ghoshal and Bartlett [7], we propose two strategies for the
intracompany deployment of service innovations: required
adoption, in which subsidiaries are required to adopt inno-
vations, and voluntary adoption, in which adoption is not
compulsory—innovations are showcased, but the adoption de-
cision is left to the subsidiaries.
The service context presents challenges for deployment.
In services, and particularly digital services, companies are
increasingly seeking to create and deploy innovations rapidly.
Service innovations can originate at all levels of the organiza-
tion, ranging from the front line to central development and
open innovation approaches [8]. The distributed nature of this
process can pose problems for the management of deployments.
The ability to leverage the innovative and entrepreneurial po-
tential of multidivisional companies’ assets in different places
is a fundamental strategic imperative [9].
The second objective of our study is thus to understand the
factors that explain failed deployment or limit the potential
broader success of deployment. We do this by conducting a
longitudinal study of a set of successful service innovations in a
major mobile telecom organization. The ten service innovations
are mainly service product innovations, but some also relate
to new business models based on process and/or product inno-
vations [2], [6]. We develop five propositions concerning their
deployment. The contribution of this paper is to advance our un-
derstanding of the process and strategies for deploying service
innovations, which can enhance competitive advantage.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
A. Intracompany Deployment of Service Innovation
Research on deployment in many contexts is a difficult task.
Fichman and Kemerer [10] contended that for innovations in IT
to have a positive effect on quality and productivity, they must
be effectively deployed, but a large proportion of the innova-
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tions studied failed to be fully deployed. Done et al. [11] found
various degrees of deployment of process innovations, with full
deployment in only one of the seven cases studied. Jensen and
Szulanski [12], studying the intracompany transfer or deploy-
ment of new management practices, found mixed results. One
set of practices had a high degree of effective adoption. Another
set faced strong resistance, “Some countries openly refused, but
most feigned enthusiasm while giving implementation only a
token effort” [12, p. 172], leading to low adoption.
In this study, we focus on the internal adoption of innovations
across diverse parts in a multidivisional organization. This intra-
company deployment process is influenced by both innovation
factors and organizational factors. One model for deployment of
innovations is diffusion [13]. The speed of adoption is affected
by how information about the innovation is communicated, so-
cial aspects such as norms, and the interconnectedness of those
concerned. Extant models of diffusion are based on users gaining
information and then deciding whether to adopt [14]; however,
successful deployment sometimes necessitates the user being
required to adopt.
Ghoshal and Bartlett [7] studied the influence of organi-
zational attributes on the creation, adoption, and deployment
of innovations—new products, processes, or administrative
systems—by the subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
They saw deployment as having two possible forms: required
adoption and diffusion. Required adoption occurs when a parent
company requires its subsidiaries to adopt innovations devel-
oped by the parent company, a central R&D facility, or other
subsidiaries of the company; diffusion occurs when a parent
company requires its innovation-developing subsidiaries to dif-
fuse their local innovations to the parent company or to other
subsidiaries.
B. Required Versus Voluntary Adoption
We build on Ghoshal and Bartlett’s [7] approaches and pro-
pose and examine two alternate strategies for deployment: re-
quired adoption and voluntary adoption.
In intracompany deployment, we define required adoption as
a strategy in which a parent company requires other parts of
the organization to adopt an innovation. We define a voluntary
adoption as a deployment strategy in which processes are put
in place to allow for diffusion of chosen innovations internally
on a voluntary basis. We take a broader view than Ghoshal and
Bartlett [7] in that innovators may or may not be required to
seek innovation diffusion. The adopter is the primary driver be-
hind the adoption decision, but the innovator plays a role in
encouraging adoption. Similarly, in innovation management lit-
erature it has been argued that companies have a choice between
“push” (technology) or “pull” (market) strategies [15]–[17] to
drive the creation of innovation and must choose a strategy
suited to each individual innovation [18]. We argue that after the
creation phase, in the deployment phase, companies still need
to make strategic choices (required versus voluntary adoption)
suited to each innovation. This leads to the following research
questions.
RQ1: What patterns of deployment strategies are used for service
innovations?
RQ2: What factors determine the conditions under which these
strategies should be used?
RQ3: What are the other factors (in addition to deployment strate-
gies) that influence the deployment outcomes?
C. Market or Organizational Fit
When many innovations are deployed, both required and vol-
untary adoptions can take place. Although the strategies for
deployment may directly affect the deployment process and
outcomes, other project-specific factors and organizational fac-
tors may also be influential. The attributes of an innovation,
especially its fit with the market and potential users, strongly
affect its adoption [13]. An innovation that better fits its po-
tential users will diffuse faster. However, in required adoption,
all relevant organizations should in principle adopt the innova-
tion regardless of fit, though we would expect that the company
would consider fit before requiring adoption. Even when be-
ing required, the subsidiary/division may be reluctant to use or
market the innovation if the fit is poor. Companies might re-
sist adoption for at least two reasons. Market or user context
can vary substantially for service innovation [19], resulting in
failed or slow deployments in contexts with poor fit. There may
also be nonmarket fit issues, such as insufficient resources (or
capability) or lack of connections to appropriate suppliers in
the adopting organization, which are seen as organizational fit
issues and would result in failed or slow deployments as well.
D. Locus of Service Innovation
Another important characteristic of innovation in services is
the distributed (or divided) nature of the innovation process and
its organization; although some innovation takes place in cen-
tral R&D, much takes place elsewhere. Zomerdijk and Voss
[20] observed a wide range of structures and responsibilities
for service innovation, and found that “one of the most striking
observations was the degree to which the development and im-
provement of service resided in the functional areas” [20. p. 13].
In services, the final product often is cocreated in the interaction
between a customer and a service provider; therefore, the role
that front-line employees play is of major importance [21].
We posit that the locus of development of an innovation will
affect the approach to deployment. There could be two possible
effects. First, innovations developed centrally will be more vis-
ible to senior management than those developed locally and are
thus more likely to be selected for either required or voluntary
deployment. Second, innovations developed centrally are more
likely to focus on organizationwide impact and are thus more
likely to be required to adopt for all subsidiaries or divisions.
Of course, the organization may also directly promote the inno-
vations developed by subsidiaries and deploy the innovations in
other subsidiaries. Thus, distance from the center makes it more
difficult for innovators to get the attention and the resources that
they need for deployment.
In addition, organizational attributes such as autonomy and
internal communication are influential factors affecting the
deployment of innovations [7]. Engaging front-line employ-
ees in the innovation process contributes to the internal mar-
keting of the new service, facilitating implementation and
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acceptance [22]. The scope of a subsidiary’s innovation is lo-
cal until the broader organization recognizes the innovation’s
value, but recognition may be hindered by organizational con-
straints (e.g., the degree of subsidiary autonomy and the size of
the organization) and innovation applicability issues. Because
of certain innovation features, deploying the same innovations
in other contexts may be difficult [23].
E. Senior Management Attention and Support
Although accessing resources is critical for service innova-
tion [24], we argue that it is just as important for deployment.
It can involve organizational change, managerial problems, and
allocation of key resources, all of which require high senior
management support [25]. Senior management attention is a
critical, scarce, and sought-after resource in organizations. In a
context in which there are multiple innovations, the attention and
support of senior management can potentially affect the success
of the deployment [26]. Young and Jordan [27] suggested that
“top management support is the most important critical success
factor for project success and is not simply one of many factors.”
It is especially important for service innovation because senior
management support for risk-taking efforts is an important as-
pect of new service development culture [28]. We argue that
for service innovations developed by subsidiaries, it is critical
to get the attention and support of senior management so that
the service innovations can be deployed to other subsidiaries.
As financial and management attention resources are limited,
not all innovations will receive enough management attention,
thus affecting their ability to be deployed. This may lead to
subsidiaries competing for headquarters’ attention to acquire
resources [29].
F. Motivation
An innovation team that is motivated to exploit their innova-
tion locally may not be motivated to devote the time and effort
needed for wider deployment. Indeed, it may detract from their
continuing work on development or day-to-day management: “A
knowledge source may be reluctant to share crucial knowledge
for fear of losing ownership, a position of privilege, superiority;
it may resent not being adequately rewarded for sharing hard
won success; or it may be unwilling to devote time and resources
to support the transfer” [30, p. 31].
Motivation can be extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic motivation
refers to performing an activity to attain a separable outcome.
Intrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity simply for the
enjoyment of the activity itself instead of for its instrumental
value [31]. Researchers agree that intrinsic motivation is vital
for innovation. Birkinshaw et al. [32] contended that innovation
does not require monetary rewards. Innovation is intrinsically
enjoyable, and it is easy to recognize and confer status on
those who put their discretionary effort into innovation. In
deployment, intrinsic motivation can result from the pride and
satisfaction of having developed a successful innovation and
from the association with the potential social and economic
benefits if the innovation is widely deployed. However, De
Jong and Den Hartog [33] argued that intrinsic motivation
is not a prerequisite for effective implementation and Ko
et al. [34] found that intrinsic motivation is more important
than extrinsic motivation except in implementation. Extrinsic
motivation can result from many sources, from payment to
promotion. The deployment of innovations differs from their
development: development requires greater creativity, and
deployment requires operational and internal marketing skills.
G. Handover of Responsibility
R&D and deployment decisions are clearly linked [4]; thus,
the arrangements for the interaction or transition between the de-
velopment and deployment processes are important. The project
teams responsible for the development process of new services
may not necessarily be the teams in charge of the deployment
process. In deploying an innovation, an organization may have
a choice as to whether to use the team that developed and intro-
duced the innovation locally for its subsequent deployment or to
hand responsibility over to another group to manage company-
wide deployment (a handover).
Although a handover can provide more appropriate resources
and capability for further deployment, it may hinder deployment
due to the need for knowledge transfer; handover knowledge is
“sticky” [35]. A change in the project team or membership can
result in a flux in coordination [36], and changes in project scope
often require effective knowledge-sharing practices [37], [38].
III. METHODOLOGY
Case studies are a preferred research strategy in building or
extending theories. They use one or more cases to create theo-
retical constructs, propositions, and/or midrange theories from
case-based evidence [39]. We adopt an embedded multiple case
study methodology based on grounded theory and an induc-
tive approach [40]–[42]. We have longitudinally studied the
deployment processes of ten service innovations within a large
company, supported by secondary data collection and archival
data. A real-time longitudinal approach helps to build a more
complete view of the process [43]. The unit of analysis is an
innovation project, consistent with Carrillo et al. [44], who sug-
gest that studies at the project and individual level are needed
to better understand aspects of innovation.
The need to study multiple projects in an innovative envi-
ronment and to compare them in a controlled manner guided
case selection [42]. The mobile telecommunications industry is
one of the most important and rapidly changing industries in
the world. Technologies, government policies, and intensifying
competition have led companies in this industry to develop new
services or new business models to maintain or increase their
market share. We study ten cases in a major mobile telecom op-
erator in China. This operator is a listed company, with around
70% of its shares held by a state-owned holding company and
others held by the public. As one of the largest operators in
the world, the company has a reputation for success, not only
in terms of its market share, and revenue, but also in terms of
its innovative new services introduced to the market. It is rec-
ognized both inside and outside China for its innovation, and
was ranked among the “The 50 most Innovative Companies” in
2010 by Business Week. The company provides a full range
of mobile telecommunications services in all 31 provinces,
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autonomous regions, and directly administered municipalities
in Mainland China and in Hong Kong, via its 31 independently
operating provincial subsidiaries (each having many city-level
subsidiaries). Each regional subsidiary is responsible for its own
profit and operations within the geographical region, although
the top management of the subsidiaries is appointed by higher
level headquarters. The company also has functional depart-
ments and research centers at both the national and provincial
headquarters levels.
When building theory from case studies, case selection should
use replication logic rather than sampling logic [41]. Each case
should be selected so that it either 1) generates similar results
(literal replication), or 2) produces contrary results for pre-
dictable reasons (theoretical replication). We selected a set of
innovation projects based on the literal replication logic. Only
innovations that are worth transferring should be transferred or
deployed [23]. All projects had been successful initially and
were expected to be deployed successfully. To control for initial
success, all innovations selected had been winners of the best
innovation award in the operator’s largest provincial company,
which accounted for one-third of the operator’s revenue and
one-fifth of its customer base. This provincial company is also
the most innovative subsidiary among all 31 provincial com-
panies, and it has 21 city-level subsidiaries and 16 functional
departments and research centers. Each year, all departments
and subsidiaries can apply for the “service innovation award”
by submitting the relevant documents (application file and pre-
sentation slides) of their service innovation project. After oral
presentations of all the projects and an evaluation process con-
ducted by a group of 15 to 20 experts in the company, all the
projects are scored across several key aspects including inno-
vativeness, financial and nonfinancial performance, generaliz-
ability, etc. Based on the ratings from the evaluation panel, 35
service innovations each year are given awards and expected
to be further deployed. Then, national awards are selected from
provincial awards with similar selection criteria and procedures.
The cases chosen are shown in Table I.
We collected objective data on deployment outcomes for each
innovation, from the initial launch in April 2009 until late 2013.
Additional data on the innovations and the processes during de-
ployment were collected through interviews and archival doc-
umentation. Semistructured interviews and secondary archival
data were used to explore the innovation context and to clarify
uncertainties in the data. Key managers involved in the deploy-
ment of the ten projects were interviewed over a three-year
period (see Fig. 1). A detailed research protocol (Appendix A)
was developed following the guidelines specified by Yin [41]
to act as a basis for the interviews. Each key manager we
interviewed was knowledgeable about the deployment of an
individual project; for some projects we also had the chance
to interview the top management and these interviews were
conducted separately. The basic descriptive information on the
cases and some information about the development team and
process were accessed from archival documentation. The in-
terviews were conducted in Chinese. An English-speaking re-
searcher was present at several key meetings at which there
was suitable translation. The interviews were recorded and sub-
sequently transcribed, then the documents and interview notes
Fig. 1. Longitudinal study timeline–A typical case.
were translated into English. The use of multiple sources of
data contributes to reliability. To further ensure reliability and
validity, we used multiple interviewers and fed the data and
conclusions back to the managers.
To study the deployment outcome, we drew on the mea-
surement of the deployment of best practices used by other
researchers. Jensen and Szulanski [12] measured the number of
recipient units adopting the initiative studied. Done et al. [11]
measured the degree to which the practices had been deployed
within the organization, from all transferred to none trans-
ferred. Building on these scales, we use a four-level model of
deployment outcomes: no deployment, city-level deployment,
provincial-level deployment, and national deployment.
The analysis was conducted in three parts. We first docu-
mented the context for each project, based on the best innovation
award documentation. We supplemented this documentation
with semistructured interviews with managers and engineers
at various levels to gain an understanding of the context of the
innovations, including the company’s innovation processes and
the organizational and competitive environment. Second, we
reviewed the objective data to analyze the trajectories and the
outcomes of the deployment of the projects and to construct
timelines over the period studied. Finally, we analyzed the inter-
view data to build a picture of the process of deployment of each
innovation and to identify key events. We followed the method-
ology of constructing and analyzing arrays suggested by Miles
and Huberman [45]. Where we identified themes, we conducted
additional interviews to examine the themes in other deploy-
ments. The qualitative data are summarized in Appendix B.
IV. RESULTS
The company studied was a multidivisional company or-
ganized in three levels: local (typically a city subsidiary
within a province), provincial, and national. Each provincial
(or city) subsidiary is responsible for its own profit and re-
source allocation within the province (or city). There are func-
tional departments and development labs at both the provincial
and national headquarters which coordinate resource alloca-
tion among city- and province-level subsidiaries. For strategi-
cally important initiatives and innovations, the company may
also set up new centers/bases (equivalent to provincial sub-
sidiaries in terms of organizational hierarchy) to take charge
of certain businesses and propel their deployment across the
country. There were nine national centers/bases in total, mainly
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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TABLE I
CASES AND DEVELOPMENT BACKGROUND
in (mobile) internet businesses. To provide an overview of the
process studied, we describe a case that was a very successful
innovation at the local level but that had problems in deploy-
ment. This case illustrates the context of the research, the com-
pany’s deployment approach, and some of the issues found (see
Appendix C).
A. Deployment Outcomes
For each case, we observed the deployment status up to the
end of 2013. We documented the deployment steps from the
initial local deployment to provincial and then national de-
ployment. The deployment outcomes of the innovations varied
greatly from no deployment at all to partial and to full deploy-
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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TABLE II
SUMMARY OF DEPLOYMENT AT THE END OF DATA COLLECTION
ment at the provincial or national level. The varying outcomes
(indicating failures and successes) provide a rich practical base
for us to build up new theory, as sound theories should be able
to analyze failures [46]. The deployment outcomes are summa-
rized in Table II.
By the end of 2013, the organization had deployed three in-
novations across multiple provincial companies. For example,
case 8, an electronic medical service, had been deployed across
16 cities in the province by July 2012, with 203 hospitals using
the service. By July 2013, nearly all provincial companies were
offering the service. This illustrates a provincial company that
initially deployed an innovative service to all local divisions
and then across multiple companies in the organization. We
found similar patterns in cases 2 and 6. The organization fully
deployed case 6 at the provincial level, and national deploy-
ment was successfully in progress, with full deployment in ten
provinces (10 million users) and building a national system
(phase 1 would serve 27 million users).
In four cases, there had been provincial deployment and some
national deployment. In some, the innovation was clearly in the
early stage of national deployment, and full deployment was
expected. An example was case 1, the synergistic classroom,
which had proved very successful. This innovation provided a
service for schools to notify children of their homework assign-
ments through their mobile phones. This was copied to their
parents’ phones, allowing them to check that their children did
their homework on time. Teachers and parents strongly wel-
comed this innovation. The number of schools in the province
using the service rose from 4831 in September 2012 to 11 636
in November 2013, and the number of student users rose from
1.55 million to 6.13 million. Further deployment did not start
until there had been substantial use in the originating province.
Thus, by November 2013 only two other provincial companies
were marketing the service. However, the company expected
that the deployment would soon become much broader.
In other cases, although some were deployed nationally, it
was not clear whether there would be widespread deployment.
For example, in case 5, although some provincial companies
were using the innovation, others had chosen not to. Some com-
panies encountering similar problems had already chosen to
use local partners and develop a similar service independently.
These cases illustrate that limited deployment may be due to
the characteristics of the innovation and/or of the context of the
potential adopter.
Case 3, BlackBerry hosting for small- and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs), had been developed at the city level. However,
after initial deployment to one other city, there was no further
deployment. By this time, BlackBerry use was declining, so
there were limited prospects for further deployment, and no
effort was made to deploy it. Finally, for case 10, mobile pay-
ment of railway tickets, initial use at the city level encountered
technical problems, and was eventually discontinued without
deployment. We illustrate these outcomes in Fig. 2.
B. Strategies for Deployment
We found both required and voluntary adoptions used as de-
ployment strategies. A key element of the voluntary deploy-
ment was making the innovation more visible to other parts of
the company. There was a policy of “showcasing” successful
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Fig. 2. Deployment trajectories of cases 1–10.
service innovations at the provincial and national levels. At the
provincial level, the award process was highly visible and would
make the innovation known to the managers at the national head-
quarters but not necessarily to other provinces. All cases studied
were award winners and would therefore have been visible to
others in the province and at the national headquarters. At the
national level, there was a parallel award system but with far
fewer innovations from each of the 31 provinces. All national
award winners would have been visible to the national headquar-
ters and all provincial companies. Cases 5 and 7 won national
awards and thus gained much more national visibility; case 8
was submitted for a national award and, although not a winner,
gained considerable national visibility. The manager of case 5
reported that “the innovation won the national award; then the
national headquarters arranged us to have meetings with other
provinces and asked us to make presentations to them. The other
provincial companies will make their own decision as to whether
to adopt this solution or not, and all of our documents are avail-
able and open to them. If they want to adopt this solution, they
can just copy what we did, or they can learn from us and de-
velop their own solution.” There were also national events that
showcased these awards; for example, case 4 was presented at
a national event. The underlying logic of this showcasing was
to demonstrate the nature and value of the innovation, to build
connections with managers elsewhere, and to motivate them to
consider taking the innovation on board as part of their portfolio
of services or internal processes. However, it was left to local
management to decide whether to adopt the innovations.
When senior management saw the innovation as very impor-
tant they sometimes exerted pressure throughout the company,
a required-deployment strategy, requiring that all should adopt
this service innovation. An example was case 2, “Mobile Mar-
ket” which headquarters initiated as a key strategic initiative.
The organization implemented the development in one province
before rolling it out to all provinces. Although consumers from
other provinces (who had not devoted efforts to coordinate with
the originating province) may also buy and download apps from
this online platform, they were not motivated by substantial
marketing programs, thus the number of consumers was not
increasing as fast as in provinces using a required-deployment
strategy.
The president made regular visits to the provinces, where
innovations were presented to him and his team. They could de-
cide to showcase an innovation nationally or go one step further
and decide to use a required-deployment strategy. Some inno-
vations diffused through a required-deployment strategy at the
provincial level but a voluntary-deployment strategy at the na-
tional level, and vice versa. For example, an innovation that was
performing very well, which initially diffused through voluntary
adoption, would come to the attention of headquarters and could
lead to the decision of changing to required adoption. Headquar-
ters saw case 8, after having been very successfully deployed in
the province, as an important innovation nationally. Therefore,
the organization set up a center in another province to facilitate
national deployment. At the national level, four innovations dif-
fused through a required-deployment strategy, and six through
a voluntary-deployment strategy initially. The showcasing and
deployment strategies are summarized in Table III.
When we examine the outcomes, all four with national-level
required adoptions were fully deployed at the provincial level,
and three (cases 1, 2, and 6) had strong national deployment. The
other, case 4, had planned national deployment. Of the voluntary
adoptions, only two of the six (cases 5 and 9) had full provincial
deployment with limited national deployment. Case 8, although
diffused through voluntary adoption at the province and na-
tional level, was changed to required adoption by the setting
up of a national center. It was quickly deployed nationally; the
others had far more limited deployment. It shows that the de-
ployment strategies can be switched to required adoption to
quicken the market success illustrated by voluntary adoption. In
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TABLE III
DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES
addition, among the three cases (3, 7, and 10) with a consistent
voluntary-deployment strategy, showcasing at the national level
(case 7) led to wider deployment compared to showcasing at
the provincial level or limited showcasing (cases 3 and 10). We
therefore put forward the following propositions.
P1a: Required adoption leads to wider deployment than voluntary
adoption, and changing from voluntary to required adoption will
speed up the deployment process.
P1b: Showcasing as a voluntary-deployment strategy conducted in
wider scope will lead to wider deployment.
C. Factors Affecting Deployment
We observed several issues leading to resistance to adoption
of the deployed service innovations. These issues included mar-
ket fit and organizational fit. The smart city mobile service case
described in Appendix C provides illustrations. The business
models associated with the innovation were less attractive in
other provinces, and this lack of market fit led to reluctance to
adopt the innovation. In case 3, the use of BlackBerry devices
declined significantly after the launch of the service, creating
barriers to deployment. There was little motivation for other di-
visions to market an innovation with a declining market. Both
are examples of lack of market fit.
In case 7, others chose to use their own partners or to use
different technology solutions. In case 5, many provincial com-
panies chose to use local partners and developed a similar service
independently. We see these as examples of the “not invented
here” (NIH) syndrome, which is “a negative attitude to knowl-
edge that originates from a source outside the own institution”
[47, p. 368]. This is consistent with Szulanski [30], who saw
NIH as a possible reason for the lack of adoption of practices
being deployed. In both cases, this was probably amplified by
the importance of guanxi, strong interpersonal and interorgani-
zation ties, in China.
These are examples of context-specific organizational fit. All
cases in which we observed fit issues were associated with less
effective deployment outcomes, but this negative impact seemed
to be weaker when there was a required-deployment strategy.
We posit that if the company chooses a required-deployment
strategy, either the possibility of lack of fit is low, or a strong
required adoption will help organizations fully deploy the in-
novation despite the poor fit. Case 2 was such an example. The
national headquarters proposed it as a key strategic initiative
and asked the provincial company to develop and deploy it. The
manager of case 2 suggested that “it would have been better if an
internet company rather than a telecom develops this platform.”
The department developing this innovation was then upgraded
to a national base (an independent internet company, at the same
level as a provincial company) to take charge of national deploy-
ment, and the initial objective for this national base was “not to
make profits (as other provincial companies did) but to compete
with other platforms provided by internet companies or mobile
phone manufacturers.”
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TABLE IV
LOCUS OF INNOVATION AND DEPLOYMENT
We therefore put forward the following proposition.
P2: Poor market or organizational fit leads to less effective deploy-
ment of all service innovations, yet this effect is weaker when a
required adoption is used as the deployment strategy.
We also find evidence that poor market or organizational fit
issues cannot always be fully eased by a required-deployment
strategy. In case 4, although it was successfully deployed across
the province, and all other provinces were also required to adopt
the innovation (the national deployment was planned centrally),
the actual national deployment was delayed, indicating that (or-
ganizational) fit issues still hindered the deployment. In addi-
tion, we need to acknowledge that market or organizational fit is
dynamic and may vary with changes in the market. In case 3, by
the time deployment efforts had started, the market attractive-
ness had substantially diminished. As deployment progresses,
the benefits of an innovation at the time of launch may diminish
and thus make the innovation unattractive for other parts of the
corporation to adopt. In case 10, the technology used was called
“RFSIM” technology, and it allowed users to use their mobile
phones (with SIM cards) as railway tickets and use the tool kit
preinstalled in SIM cards to pay for the tickets. However, the
innovation was only tested in two cities and was not deployed
at all, and at the same time smartphones based on Android or
iOS became more and more popular in China. Then, toward
the end of 2013 the external partner China Railway launched
its own mobile app for national-wide online ticket ordering,
which made this innovation less attractive and far less likely to
merit deployment. These cases suggested that slow or delayed
deployment risks loss of market or organizational fit.
Further, based on results from the case analyses we summa-
rize the findings concerning the locus of deployment and de-
ployment outcomes. We first compared locally developed and
headquarters-developed innovations, and the data indicate that
although some locally developed innovations were deployed
widely, more of those developed at the headquarters level had
been widely deployed (see Table IV). The managers we inter-
viewed provided support and explanations for this. The manager
of case 5 pointed out that “at the provincial headquarters level,
it is very easy for us to implement better solutions or innova-
tive ideas across the province, such as this case. But for the
city-level companies (subsidiaries), it is an issue to diffuse their
innovations to other cities within the province.” The manager
of case 4 explained that “the city-level companies are limited
in their scope, and sometimes what they think is useful and
characteristic may not be so useful to other cities.”
We then sought evidence for the role of senior management
in innovations developed by subsidiaries. Of the four locally de-
veloped innovations, the strongest senior management support
was in cases 7 and 9, in which senior management was directly
involved. Both cases achieved better deployment than cases 3
and 10, which had limited support. Even for the innovations
with a required-deployment strategy, senior management atten-
tion was an important driver for deployment. We had the chance
to interview a manager from the company’s external partner
for case 1, who helped with the local deployment in different
schools across different cities. The manager suggested that “the
deployment outcome is determined by their head (city-level gen-
eral manager), although his or her performance indicators set by
the provincial headquarters were not directly related to this inno-
vation; if their head pays much attention to this innovation, they
will allocate more resources and devote more efforts to coordi-
nate with us.” Further, although the three national-deployment
cases (2, 6, and 8) did not have the formal involvement of provin-
cial senior management, there were other forms of management
attention (see Appendix B). Senior management attention was
also associated with government support. Case 1 illustrated this
correlation, as when media reported on the innovation the com-
pany was invited to report to the national Ministry of Education.
Afterward, other provincial companies were required to learn
from the case province.
Given the organizational structure of this large telecom firm,
senior management attention can also be determined by their
potential opportunities of promotion. One clear promotion path
is from provincial to central management positions, thus the
competition between the provincial subsidiaries could be an
important influential factor in service innovation deployment,
especially when there are significant duplicate innovation efforts
across the subsidiaries. This creates an extrinsic motivation for
senior managers to deploy their own service innovations, but
may also lead to NIH syndrome in adopting service innovations
developed by others.
Our interviews indicated that there was a complex relation-
ship between motivation and actual managerial decisions and/or
efforts toward deployment. For example, in case 2 (required
adoption), the team made a lot of effort to deploy the innovation
because they felt that it would make the provincial operation
famous for innovation compared to other provinces. Similarly,
in the smart city mobile service (case 7, voluntary adoption)
described in Appendix C, there was also intrinsic motivation to
deploy; managers reported pride and the associated kudos of
seeing their innovation deployed as motivating them to actively
seek to deploy their innovations. However, the managers also
indicated that involvement in deployment would hinder their
work and that there were no direct incentives for deployment.
This reflected a lack of extrinsic motivation, which potentially
contributed to limited deployment. In other cases, many intervie-
wees indicated that extrinsic motivation was important in their
involvement with deployment. For example, in case 1 (required
adoption), the city-level subsidiaries needed to decide whether
to allocate resources to deploy the innovation. They stated that
“it would be more easily deployed if the provincial headquarters
set performance indicators directly related with this innovation.”
Specific targets were seen to act as an incentive for managers
to support and work on deployment. In another example, inter-
viewees believed that one of the key factors in engaging them
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in deployment was supporting actions that could lead to their
supervisor’s promotion. This may be particular to the Chinese
company context, as the promotion of a supervisor also opens
up opportunities for promotion of subordinates. Based on these
findings, we put forward the following proposition.
P3: Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation can both contribute to de-
ployment outcomes, but the lack of an extrinsic motivation hinders
deployment significantly, and this negative impact is stronger when
a voluntary adoption is used as the deployment strategy.
In deploying service innovations, the capabilities needed for
deployment may not exist in the innovation team; there may be
a handover to teams or organizations with more appropriate ca-
pabilities. Handovers varied from transferring responsibility to
a new team to, as in case 2, upgrading the provincial department
to national status as this gave them greater ability to coordi-
nate with all provincial-level companies so that the deployment
could be conducted more smoothly. Five of the cases—1, 2,
4, 6, and 7—involved formal handovers. In the five cases with
handovers, there were two full national deployments and one
partial national deployment, compared with two partial national
deployments among the five cases without handovers. These
results do not provide support for previous literature empha-
sizing the stickiness of handover knowledge and difficulties in
coordination or knowledge-sharing. Instead, our data indicated
that when the teams handed the innovations over to a new team,
the deployment was more successful. We conclude that the dis-
advantages of handovers were outweighed by their advantages
when new skills and/or resources are important. We therefore
put forward the following proposition.
P4: Deployment is more effective if responsibility for deployment
is handed over to a team with appropriate capabilities.
Managers saw handovers as being useful in two main related
contexts. First, they are useful when the development team did
not have the resources to manage the deployment. Second, the
teams used handovers when deployment was beyond the scope
of the development team. For example, a local development and
marketing group may not have the skills necessary to deploy
an innovation across the company. In this sense, the handover
may also indicate the change of deployment strategy. As shown
in cases 4 and 8, a handover is needed when the deployment
strategy changes from voluntary adoption to required adoption.
We also expect that different handover experiences may exist
when subsidiary A starts the innovation adoption process before
the change of deployment strategy while subsidiary B starts the
process after the change. We suggest that for subsidiary A, more
coordination work or reprocessing may be needed in handover,
as it may already have its own teams and procedures for innova-
tion adoption. Although our cases did not provide such evidence,
we believe that this could be a further research opportunity.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Theoretical Contributions
Companies put significant effort into developing innovations
both for internal use and for external markets. However, in
multidivisional and multinational organizations, local success
in implementing such innovations is not enough. Companies
seeking to maximize the return on their innovation efforts must
seek to deploy the innovations across the organization. Our
study indicates that this task is complex and sometimes diffi-
cult. To address this issue, companies need policies and prac-
tices that support the deployment of service innovations. We
proposed two alternate deployment strategies, required adop-
tion and voluntary adoption, an important extension to those
suggested by Ghoshal and Bartlett [7]. Ghoshal and Bartlett [7]
studied required adoption (top down) and diffusion (bottom up,
but also required), whereas we have taken the broader view that
innovators may or may not be required to seek to diffuse the
innovation. Our data indicate that a required adoption is more
effective than a voluntary adoption in further deploying the ser-
vice innovations, and that companies may change their strategies
between required adoption and voluntary adoption, leading to
more complex strategic choices of deployment patterns. Stim-
ulating service innovation is a major research priority seen by
leading service scholars [1], [2]. By exploring required- and
voluntary-deployment strategies, our research advances theory
and practice of service innovation, as the final success of ser-
vice innovations depends largely on the effective deployment of
initial innovation outcomes [6].
Addressing our first research question, the case evidence
confirmed that the company clearly used both required- and
voluntary-deployment strategies for almost all the innovations
studied. However, companies may also change their strategies
from one to the other. In addition to individual innovations dif-
fused through either a required adoption or voluntary adoption,
we found other patterns. The first was a required adoption at
the local level but a voluntary adoption nationally. The equiv-
alent in a multinational firm would be a required adoption in
the country of origin but a voluntary adoption internationally.
A second pattern was starting with a voluntary adoption, but
converting to a required adoption when the importance or suc-
cess of the innovation became visible to senior management. We
therefore propose that required and voluntary adoptions are key
strategic choices in the deployment of innovations. The choice
is dynamic, and any innovation can be shifted from one strategy
to the other during the deployment process. In addition, by de-
fault, innovations may not necessarily be chosen for deployment
at all.
To address our second research question, we explored with
the company their reasons for choices made between required
adoptions, which would clearly lead to faster deployment, and
voluntary adoptions, which could be slower in a context in which
the organization considered deployment important. The prime
reason for needing to make such decisions was the volume of
service innovations being developed each year, often exceeding
20 000. Given that the managerial resources needed to rapidly
deploy an innovation were limited, the company had to make
choices. They put forward the following criteria for choosing
a required-deployment strategy: first, which innovations would
be most beneficial to the company as a whole given the allo-
cation of these resources? This could be the presence of clear
and achievable benefits and the likelihood of successful adop-
tion. The interviewees saw some innovations as easy to transfer,
whereas others would require substantial local tailoring. This is
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consistent with our proposition on the need for market and orga-
nizational fit. Second, would the innovation benefit from promo-
tion through making it visible across the company via mecha-
nisms such as innovation competitions and showcasing? Finally,
were the benefits strong enough to justify the resources allo-
cated for a required adoption? The stronger the cross-company
benefits, the greater the likelihood of choosing a required
adoption. Despite these criteria, managers stated that making
such decisions in the context of multiple innovations was very
difficult.
We conclude that in any organization seeking intracompany
deployment of many innovations, the company must make deci-
sions about which innovations to select for investment in deploy-
ment. There are two potential limits to the number of innova-
tions that can be actively deployed. The first limit is the resources
available. A required-deployment strategy requires considerable
resources, and many elements of voluntary-deployment strategy
such as internal prizes and showcasing also demand resources.
Deployment also requires resources by the adopter, who may
not be able to exploit innovations because of a lack of absorptive
capacity [30]. The second limit is the number of innovations that
any part of the organization can adopt at one time.
An important managerial choice is how to organize for
deployment. For example, decisions need to be made about
whether and when to handover an innovation from the original
team to a new team responsible for deployment. Deployment
requires internal knowledge transfer, and much knowledge can
often be “sticky” [35]. Thus, handovers to a new team requiring
sticky knowledge to be transferred can negatively affect deploy-
ment. However, the case evidence points in the other direction.
This may indicate that problems associated with sticky knowl-
edge may be outweighed by the advantages of choosing another
team with proper resources or deployment skills.
To address the third research question, we summarized the
case evidence and put forward three more propositions (P2, P3,
and P4) concerning the other factors that influence the deploy-
ment outcomes jointly with required- and voluntary-deployment
strategies. The case evidence supported that locally developed
innovations face greater barriers to deployment than those de-
veloped more centrally. Locally developed innovations are usu-
ally less visible, and are more likely to encounter difficulties in
gaining management attention or having the resources, skills,
and motivation needed for deployment. This is consistent with
Ambos and Birkinshaw [29], who conclude that when aiming
to integrate a portfolio of differentiated subsidiaries, the alloca-
tion of headquarters’ attention has become a key strategic issue.
Distance from headquarters can lead to a lack of skill and re-
sources for deployment, lower levels of management visibility
and support, and lower motivation to deploy. As a result, locally
developed innovations may take longer to deploy. Innovations
developed locally, often in the front line, could thus be more dif-
ficult to deploy than those developed at the headquarters level.
This leads us to a dilemma facing the management of service or-
ganizations. Because of the customer-facing nature of services,
many important innovations will be codeveloped near the front
line but will not necessarily be visible to senior management or
the wider organization. Thus, it is important for organizations
to pay close attention in seeking and recognizing the locally
developed innovations to avoid losing many of the benefits of
innovation.
Although intrinsic motivation is clearly very important for
the development of innovation, we observed that without ex-
trinsic innovation, the motivation to innovate may not turn into
the motivation to deploy, which hinders the deployment more
significantly. This may be particularly true for locally developed
innovations for which the need to face day-to-day operational
pressures may conflict with the deployment targets. This is con-
sistent with Szulanski [30], who argues that there are motiva-
tional barriers to knowledge transfer. As such, companies would
learn that motivational efforts could be done in tandem with de-
ployment strategies to encourage faster and wider adoption.
With a voluntary, diffusion-based, model of deployment, if an
innovation does not provide value to the receiving organization,
we would expect some resistance to adoption. Even when there
is required adoption, a lack of internal or external fit for the re-
ceiving organization may create resistance to deployment. This
indicates that even when an organization is pursuing a required-
deployment strategy, the organization should pay close attention
to fit issues. Questions about fit may lead to the possibility of
adapting the innovation to enhance fit or to selectively deploy
the innovation only in locations where the fit is good. We also
observed that the degree of fit with the market may decrease
over time, which often calls for rapid deployment of service
innovations.
B. Limitations
Although the sample size was ten projects, which is suitable
for case-based research [42], this number means that the results
should be treated with caution. Although the case data provided
support with details for the propositions, further research with
different methods and possibly larger samples will be needed.
We selected a single firm and a rapidly changing industry as the
context for service innovation deployment. This control allowed
us to develop strong insights into the processes involved but also
limits generalizability [42]. The outcome variable was mainly
about the scale of deployment given the rapidly changing in-
dustry and the need for cross-case comparability, yet we expect
that in other stable service industries different outcome variables
might be appropriate and lead to promising new findings.
We studied deployment in China. Because of the size of
the country and the scale of the major companies, China is
an appropriate setting to examine deployment and presents
great opportunities for operations and innovation management
research [48]. Conducting research in a single country, or
region, whether China or the West, raises questions of gener-
alizability. However, the context of a large multidivisional and
multilocation company in China is comparable to the context
of similar sized companies and countries worldwide. Recent
years have seen high-tech service innovations prosper in China,
enjoying the advantages of fast deployment in a large domestic
market. For countries such as India, the United States, Russia,
and Brazil, which also have large populations and/or use single
official languages, our findings may be more generalizable,
yet caution still needs to be taken in contexts of different
governance structures and regulations.
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In addition, the operations in multiple, very large provinces
are in many ways equivalent to multinational companies operat-
ing in multiple countries. However, we observed several specific
aspects of business in China that affected deployment and which
may lead to some bias. One aspect is guanxi networks which
are essential for doing business in China [48]. Although guanxi
has been viewed as a positive aspect of supply chain manage-
ment in China, in the context of deployment, it seemed to have
led to the possibility of NIH because companies preferred to
work with their own networks instead of networks from other
provinces. We also observed some aspects of motivation such
as the importance of supporting one’s boss’s promotion, which
might be specific to the Chinese context. However, these aspects
were only part of the case evidence behind our propositions, and
we feel that even taking into account the Chinese context the
relevant propositions were still insightful. For future research,
replication in a Western context and in different services would
give greater validity to the results.
C. Conclusions and Implications for Practice
Implicit in innovation research is the assumption that a suc-
cessful innovation will be exploited across the organization.
However, our research challenges this notion. Consistent with
the research in other areas, we found that the transfer of inno-
vations (i.e., deployment) is difficult. Based on a longitudinal
study, these results contribute to our understanding of the strate-
gies and mechanisms of deployment and the factors that may
contribute to or hinder it. We proposed and explored voluntary
adoption and required adoption as two strategies for deployment,
and we provided insights into the effects of different deployment
patterns and their contingencies.
Our results are relevant to service organizations that in-
creasingly need to innovate rapidly and successfully. Strategic
choices, such as voluntary and required adoption, can help the
organizations become more successful. The first implication for
practice is that promoting an innovation and requiring others to
adopt, a required-deployment strategy will lead to more rapid
deployment, but there are resource constraints on how many
innovations can be required to adopt at any one time. This calls
for a strategy for identifying which innovations should be re-
quired to adopt and which not, and for the allocation of scarce
managerial resources. This strategy should be dynamic as the
potential for some innovations may be revealed only after a pe-
riod of use (which is often local). The top management of the
case company also stated that “our judgment about a particu-
lar important innovation based on the current situation may not
be accurate enough, thus sometimes we may use a pull strat-
egy (i.e., voluntary adoption) first to test and see if we need
to push (i.e., change to required adoption) later on.” The sec-
ond implication is to have in place mechanisms for making
other potentially valuable innovations visible to potential in-
ternal adopters through a voluntary-deployment strategy. Such
mechanisms could include, but are not limited to, those ob-
served in the cases such as best innovation competitions and
showcasing. The third implication is that market and organi-
zational fit and extrinsic and intrinsic motivation would affect
deployment outcomes jointly with deployment strategies. As
such, managerial efforts addressing fit or motivational issues
could be done in tandem with deployment strategies to encour-
age faster and wider adoption. The final implication is that if the
development team does not have the necessary capabilities or re-
sources to manage deployment, they should hand the innovation
over to a team that does.
There is scope for further research in most of the areas stud-
ied, for example, how effective decisions can be made regard-
ing required- versus voluntary-deployment strategies and allo-
cating resources for deployment. We identified organizing for
deployment as an important decision, and there is scope for
more in-depth research into how to organize for deployment
and what the tradeoffs are between different choices. Future
research into the deployment of service innovations should con-
tribute to maximize their potential. Further, research opportuni-
ties also exist in extending the current focus on required versus
voluntary deployment, and there is potentially a meaningful ma-
trix with required/voluntary deployment on one dimension and
top-down/bottom-up on the other dimension.
APPENDIX A
CASE RESEARCH PROTOCOL
Description:
This document serves as a guideline that has specified the
types of questions that we would like to ask about the service
innovation project.
Background:
1) Why did this project start and who proposed it?
2) Please describe how your company organized this project,
the team members of the project and their respective re-
sponsibilities.
3) Did this project involve other departments/subsidiaries/
external partners in development process? How did they
involve?
4) Could you please describe the development process of this
innovation? What difficulties and how to deal with?
5) How successful was this project in terms of prize-
winning? What were the factors do you think that could
lead to success of the development?
Deployment of Service Innovations:
6) Could you please describe the process of deployment
and handover (if there was a handover)? Are there any
interactions between development team and deployment
team before and after the handover? What were the in-
teractions?
7) How did the project go after winning the award? What is
the current status of this innovation? Has the innovation
been deployed nationally or is it going to be deployed
nationally? What are the incentives and attractiveness for
the deployment of this innovation?
8) Who/Which department(s) was responsible for the de-
ployment of the innovation?
a) If it was the same department, did the members of
project team change?
b) If it was another department, did the original team
get involved or not?
c) How did top management support the deployment
of the innovation?
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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE CASE DATA
9) Were there any external partners involved in the deploy-
ment of this innovation? What were the roles played
by them and how did you collaborate and interact with
them?
10) What were the difficulties faced by this innovation
when it was deployed? How did the company deal
with these difficulties generally and for this project
specifically?
11) Do you think this innovation has been well deployed?
Can you provide some current data about the per-
formance of this innovation, e.g., impact on prof-
its/revenues/sales/market share? Are there any other pos-
sibilities that this innovation could be more widely and
well deployed?
12) Are there any questions that you think I should have
asked but I have not?
13) Are there any other people that you think I should inter-
view?
14) If you would start this project today, how would you
manage it differently?
APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE CASE DATA
See Table V
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APPENDIX C
ILLUSTRATIVE CASE—SMART CITY MOBILE SERVICE (CASE 7)
This innovation was part of the development of a “smart city”
in a major provincial city. In collaboration with the city and
a technology supplier, a mobile phone payment system for all
transportation within the city was developed. Despite costs be-
ing higher than anticipated, the service was considered very
successful and won local and national innovation awards. Given
the clear success, national headquarters actively encouraged de-
ployment, promoted the service to other cities and provinces,
and showcased it via a national innovation award. Despite this,
the deployment was much slower than expected. By the end of
the study, only one city in the province and two cities in other
provinces had adopted the service.
The case had several issues affecting deployment. Although
there was personal motivation to deploy, there were no direct
incentives to support deployment. The team members’ opportu-
nities for promotion did not depend on deployment, and senior
management did not provide incentivization to deploy the ser-
vice. Second, despite headquarters’ active support for deploy-
ment, there was no systematic nationwide effort to deploy. In
addition, other divisions wanted to adapt the innovation to their
own circumstances, adding time and cost. For example, one
provincial subsidiary that adopted the innovation used a differ-
ent technological solution. Another province wanted to use its
own technology partner instead of the partner from the origi-
nal city. These subsidiaries were therefore unable to build on
the technology partner’s expertise, making potential adoption
more problematic and slower. Finally, the business model that
worked in the first city was not always applicable in other cities.
The original city was motivated to become a smart city and
provided financial and nonfinancial support. The average age in
the city was around 30, which also facilitated the adoption of
smart services. Other cities may not have had this motivation.
Thus, the business model of the innovation might be context
specific.
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